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Introduction
30
Many countries are facing the challenge of providing health and social care to populations 31 containing increasing proportions of elderly people. In the UK, for example, there are 32 expected to be 3.2 million people over the age of 85 by 2034, more than double the number 33 today (ONS 2015) . In addition, it is expected that a high proportion of elderly people will 34 be living on their own, a factor strongly associated with the need to move into a residential 35 or nursing care home. Faced with increasing fiscal pressures, many governments have 36 been considering alternatives to public provision of health and social care. Up to the 1980's 37 over 80% of adult residential care was provided by the public sector, but today public 38 sector facilities account for only 8% of the available places, with the rest being provided by 39 a mixture of for-profit firms (74%) and non-profit charities (18%). The public sector's role 40 is often now that of purchaser (paying the fees of people unable to afford them) and 41
regulator. 42
In essence, then, residential and nursing care outside of hospitals in the UK, once provided 43 mainly by the public sector, has been turned into a form of quasi-market, differing from a 44 conventional market in that a significant number of providers are not-for-profit 45 organizations and by the fact that a large proportion of the individuals who use residential 46 and nursing care do not purchase the service directly; the state acts as purchaser on their 47 M A N U S C R I P T Is there reason to believe that competition among providers of residential and nursing 119 home care in England is strong? Over 50% of care homes in England are operated by 120 owners that run four or fewer facilities. There are no major brands in the residential care 121 market in England (LaingBuisson 2014) , while the median size of these facilities is 23 beds. 122
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These factors imply low barriers to entry into the market, which reinforces the expectation 123 that the market should be very competitive (Porter 1980 ). Forder and Allan (2014) 124 conducted an analysis of competition in the care homes market in England. While they did 125 indeed find that there was evidence of competition, they also showed that this can have the 126 surprising consequence of reducing quality because homes will find it harder to attract self-127 payers (who generally pay higher prices) while allowing the local authorities to push the 128 prices they pay down. If for-profit providers are less concerned with quality, then it would 129 be expected that quality will be lower in for-profit facilities even in the presence of 130
competition. 131
In any event, competition will only have an impact if potential service users can accurately 132 assess the quality of care they will receive, and if existing users are able to switch providers 133 if they are dissatisfied. One reason why this may be problematic is that it may be difficult 134 for people to evaluate the quality of facilities before they have moved in. People often 135 move in to residential care in a time of crisis, such as the death of a spouse or deteriorating 136 health, so they may find it difficult to visit candidate facilities in advance, and they may be 137 relying on other people (such as family members) to choose for them. Even if pre-138 admission visits are possible, it is difficult to evaluate what the experience of living in aM A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 7 facility will be like during a short visit. This might not matter as much if it were easy for 140 people to move to a different facility if they are unhappy with their first choice, but we 141 know that such moves are very rare in practice, in part because of concerns for the adverse 142 impact of such moves (Grabowski and Hirth 2003) . Under such circumstances, the 143 incentive to compete on quality may be attenuated, with price becoming a more important 144 factor in the minds of potential residents (Forder and Allan 2011) . In addition, for-profit 145 homes may have an incentive to reduce quality so as to reduce costs and hence increase 146 returns to owners. This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that the quality of care provided 147 in facilities owned by for-profit providers will, on average, be lower than that provided by 148 facilities operated by a public authority or non-profit organization. 149
However, this ignores the role played by the industry regulator, which in England is the 150 Care Quality Commission (CQC). The regulator may have an impact in two ways. First, 151 their inspection regime and ability to enforce standards of care may result in a reduction in 152 variation in the quality of care. It is still possible that public and non-profit providers could 153 be more likely to provide care that significantly exceeds the minimum standards required 154 by the regulator, but regulation should provide a floor below which standards do not drop. 155
Second, the CQC's inspection reports and quality ratings are freely available to the public 156 via the CQC's own website and via third party websites that are intended to make it easier 157 for people to locate residential and nursing care facilities in the geographical area of their 158 choice. As a result, the people searching for a care home may be better informed than they 159 would have been before the widespread availability of regulatory inspection ratings via the 160 internet.
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We should also consider the possibility that there is variation in the degree to which users, 162 or potential users, of residential care are well informed. It may be that people who are able 163 to access the internet, who are able to visit and compare facilities, or who are able to draw 164 on the support and advice of family members and friends will be relatively well positioned 165 to form accurate judgements about the relative quality of different facilities, while others 166 who are not in this position will be less well informed. Arrow (1963) argued that many 167 people who find it difficult to assess a facility's quality will prefer non-profit or public 168
sector providers because such organizations will be perceived to be motivated to deliver 169 high quality care, with no conflict of interest caused by the pressure to deliver returns to 170 investors. If so, then it follows that for-profit providers will be competing for users who are 171 better informed than average, and this will force them to maintain quality. In other words, 172 competition from non-profit and publicly operated facilities plays an important function in 173 influencing the quality of for-profit providers over and above that of straightforward 174 competition among for-profit providers. 175
These arguments are all consistent with the hypothesis that for-profit operated facilities 176 will tend to have lower quality, although such tendencies may be mitigated by the existence 177 of a regulator and competition. However, in the presence of a competitive market and well-178 informed customers it is possible that for-profit care homes that are part of a large 179 corporate group could offer superior quality to non-profit or for-profit facilities run by 180 reported lower costs, but other studies have failed to find similar evidence (Chen and Shea 190 2004) . Given this weak evidence, we would still expect that for-profit providers will be of 191 equal or lower quality than those in the non-profit sector. 192
Literature review 193
There is little existing evidence on quality differences in health and social care provision 194 between public, non-profit and for-profit providers in the UK, although there is a significant 
Hypothesis: 217
The quality of residential and nursing care homes operated by for-profit providers will be 218 lower than those operated by public authorities and/or non-profit organizations, controlling 219 for a range of other variables that are associated with quality. 220
Data and methods
221
The data we analyse were provided by LaingBuisson, specialist consultants in this field. Each of these five standards is each given one of four ratings: Outstanding ("the service is 269 performing exceptionally well"); Good ("the service is performing well and meeting 270 expectations"); Requires improvement ("the service isn't performing as well as it should, 271 and has been told how it must improve"); or Inadequate ("the service is performing badly, 272 and enforcement action has been taken"). By law, these ratings have to be displayed in the 273 residential care facility where they can easily be seen, and they also have to be shown on 274 the facility's website. 275
One possible critique of these ratings is that they involve an element of subjectivity, which 276 some might consider a disadvantage relative to studies that draw on quantitatiave Each of these five "chapters" was give one of three ratings: All standards met; At least one 300 standard not met; At least one standard not being met requiring enforcement action.
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In addition to separate analyses of the facilities that have old and new-style inspection 302 ratings, we also combine them so that we can analyse the entire set of care facilities. To do 303 this, we have to make the two inspection regimes consistent by coding them both into three 304 categories: Good, which includes the "Outstanding" as well as the "Good" category in the 305 new system, and is equivalent to "all standards met" in the old system; Poor, which includes 306 "requires improvement" from the new system and "at least one standard not met" under 307 the old regime; Inadequate, which, as well as the category of this name in the new regime 308 also includes "at least one standard requiring enforcement action" from the old standards. 309
We carry out three sets of analyses, one based on facilities that were subject to the older 310 rating system; one based on the new inspection system; and a third that combines all 311 facilities using the three-category system described above. 312
It is worth noting that none of these ratings can strictly be considered a measure of 313 resident outcomes, although there is evidence that outcome measures are related to the 314 'old' inspection ratings (Netten et al. 2010, p. 85). Nevertheless, this is a limitation of the 315 study. 316
Explanatory variables
317
The key explanatory variable is the type of owner of the establishment. This variable has 318 three categories: local authority; private for-profit; private non-profit. Other explanatory 319 variable are the number of beds in the facility; its age since first registration; whether or 320 not the building was purpose-built as a care home; whether the establishment is classified 321 as a 'care home with nursing' or a 'care home without nursing'; and whether the primary 322 registered client group is people suffering from dementia. The latter variable is included 323 because it is known that homes find it more challenging to provide a good quality of life for 324 Tables 1 and 2 show cross tabulations of the numbers of establishments that received each 355 of the available inspection outcomes using the old and new systems, respectively, along 356 with the counts that would be expected if CQC quality rating was independent of ownership 357 type (Agresti 2013). We can see that in table 1, there are approximately 41 more non-358 profit owned homes that are fully compliant than would be expected, while there are 359 almost exactly the same number fewer for-profit homes that receive this CQC rating. 360
Similarly, we can see that there are about 37 fewer non-profit homes that have at least one 361 area of non-compliance about a similar number more for-profit homes than would be 362 expected. 363 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 364
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Regression results
374
Although the contingency tables suggest that there are differences in quality among the 375 three ownership types, this form of analysis does not control for the inclusion of other 376 variables that might affect the relationship between ownership type and quality of care. 377
We therefore present three sets of ordinal regression results. The first set, shown in table  378 4, are based on the old inspection regimes, while the second set (table 5) 
[Table 4 about here] 396
As regards the other variables, homes that do not provide nursing care mostly have slightly 397 better quality ratings, but the differences are not statistically significant. Quality of care 398 tends to decline as the number of beds in a home increases, but only two of the coefficients 399 are significant (staffing and needs). The signs on the age of the care home variable are all 400 negative, implying that older homes tends to be rated as of lower quality, but only three are 401 significant, with "respect" being the largest estimate. Whether or not the home was 402 purpose built seems to have little effect on quality of care, which is somewhat surprising 403 giving results of previous studies showing that purpose built homes tend to have higher 404 quality (Forder and Allan 2014) . Homes that provide dementia care tend to have lower 405 quality ratings, although mostly these are not statistically significant. Overall, the most 406 important impact on quality is whether or not the care is a "not-for-profit" organization, 407 which is associated with highly significant, positive coefficients on each of the measures of 408 quality.
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New inspection regime
410
Regression results using the new inspection system's quality ratings as outcome variable 411 are shown in table 5. Using the new inspection regime, non-profit homes again 412 significantly out-perform their for-profit counterparts. This time, though, we can see that 413 local authority run facilities are also likely to have a higher quality rating than those run by 414 for-profit operators, at least on some of the quality criteria. Whereas in the previous table, 415 the distinction between residential and nursing home quality was not significant, all five 416 coefficients are positive and significant for residential care, implying that homes that 417 provide nursing care are less likely to obtain good CQC inspection ratings, perhaps because 418 it is more challenging to recruit and retain professionally qualified staff.. 419
Once again, the probability of obtaining better CQC ratings declines as the number of beds 420 in a home increases. For-profit homes are, on average, larger (a mean of 26.9 beds) than 421 local authority (24.5) or non-profit (21.7) facilities. We can also see that, based on the more 422 recent inspections, older homes also tend to have lower quality ratings from the CQC, as do 423 homes that provide dementia care. 424
[ 
Combining quality measures
426
In this final set of results, we combine the two types of quality inspection systems into a 427 single response variable, as described above. The benefit of this is the increase in sample 428 size, although we need to be slightly cautious as the five components of the two different 429 inspection systems are not identical. These results are shown in table 6. Once again we see 430 that local authority and private non-profit facilities are significantly more likely to receive 431 better quality ratings from the CQC than for-profit facilities; differences between local 432 M A N U S C R I P T
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20 authority and not-for-profit providers are not statistically significant. Providing residential 433 as opposed to nursing care is again associated with higher quality. Smaller and newer 434 homes are also more likely to be highly rated by the regulator. By way of illustration, the 435 probability of a for-profit, 20-bedded home being rated "Good" or "Outstanding" for the 436
Safety category (column 1 in table 6) is 0.85, while the corresponding probability for a 60-437 bedded facility is 0.75. For the same category, a five year old home has a probability of 438 being rated "Good" or "Outstanding" of 0.88, while the corresponding probability for a 30 439 year old home is 0.80. Whether or not a care home is purpose built shows negative signs 440 across all five coefficients, but only three are significant. Caring for patients with dementia 441 is once again negative and significant in relation to lower quality of care. Homes that have 442 a primary client code of Dementia have a probability of a "Good" or "Outstanding" rating in 443 the Safety category 0.79 compared to 0.84 for those with other primary client codes. 444
[ Table 6 about here] 445
To illustrate the scale of the effects, using the mean values of control variables, the 446 predicted probabilities of being in each of the three rating categories based on this final set 447 of regression parameter estimates are shown in the set of effect plots in figure 2. This 448 graphically illustrates the lower probability of For-profit providers obtaining the best CQC 449 ratings and their higher probability of being rated "Poor". 450
[ Figure 2 about here] 451
Discussion
452
We have shown that, based on the inspection ratings of the care home regulator, care 453 homes and nursing homes that are operated by non-profit organizations and those that are 454 M A N U S C R I P T
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run by local authorities are, on average, of higher quality than those operated by for-profit 455 providers. There is, however, no clear difference in quality between facilities operated by 456 non-profit organisations or local authorities. These differences are found across all five of 457 the components of quality rated by the CQC and using information on quality provided by 458 the old and the new inspection regimes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that quality 459 differences exist because quasi-market competition is attenuated by the difficulty people 460 have in evaluating the quality of provision and/or transferring out of a facility that they 461 find inadequate once they become resident there. The fact that these differences are 462 relatively small suggests that the regulator is having the effect of reducing these quality 463 differences by ensuring standards are maintained and/or by increasing the availability of 464 information to potential service users. 465
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that standards of care in for-profit facilities are 466 bad. Indeed, the majority of homes of all types are rated good or better by the CQC. Most 467 care home places are provided by the for-profit sector, and these results do not suggest 468 that this is the source of a quality problem. What's more, the reason for the predominance 469 of the for-profit sector is presumably that they are able to access the capital needed to build 470 new facilities. 471
We might ask whether there are any general lessons for the operation of quasi-markets. 472
The provision of residential and nursing home care is closer to a conventional market than 473 any of the other quasi-markets that have been developed in the UK public service sector in 474 that there is a large amount of choice available to users, many of the service providers are 475 in the private sector, and many users pay for their own care in full or in part. This contrasts 476
sharply with the quasi-market that now operates in the NHS, where almost all providers responsiveness to the needs of service users has improved, but at least quality of care, in 488 the main, seems to be reasonable. However, it is clear that maintaining this level of quality 489 would be unlikely in the absence of a regulator, which is necessary to protect the public 490 because of the difficulty they would face evaluating care quality themselves. The cost of the 491 regulator has, then, to be counted against the benefits produced by introducing the quasi-492 market. In addition, the large number of private providers introduces an element of risk 493 into the system of care provision; private providers-both for-profit and non-profit-are 494 more vulnerable to the risk of failure than their public sector counterparts. • Study of quality of care homes for adults in England.
• Care is delivered by public, not-for-profit and for-profit providers.
• Quality of care is significantly lower among for-profit providers.
• Non-profit providers have the highest quality.
• Differences in quality are relatively small, so regulation may be effective
